Dual Use: The Flipside of Biotech
Genetic technology is becoming increasingly powerful. How can we avoid its misuse?
The world changed forever when the first bomb fell. The unspeakable horror of weapons of mass destruction awakened the world to the knowledge that technological progress could be used for good and evil in equal measure–nuclear power and nuclear weapons are two sides of the same coin. The use of scientific discoveries to simultaneously help and harm humanity has persisted. The discovery of acetylcholine by neuroscientists treated countless neuromotor diseases yet also led to the creation of nerve agents. The Nobel Prize-winning Haber process vastly increased the world’s agricultural capabilities, yet it was also used to mass produce nitrogen explosives. (It’s of note that Fritz Haber also spearheaded the development of chlorine, mustard, and phosgene gas, killing millions in war while saving billions through agriculture). Now, as geneticists, it is our turn to develop revolutionary technologies.
Dual use is the abuse of essential, beneficial scientific advancements to harm humanity and engage in warfare. Biotechnology is a flourishing, exponentially growing field capable of transforming the genetic code of human beings. Therefore, dual use in biotechnology presents an existential peril. Firstly, biotech has unprecedented power to alter the genetic fabric of critical organisms as well as humanity itself. Secondly, intellectual content and genetic tools are becoming increasingly accessible to an unvetted public. If biotechnology is to avoid becoming an instrument of violence through dual use, addressing these issues is crucial.
Since biotechnology’s sheer power and potential means consequences for misuse are catastrophic, researchers must work alongside ethicists and regulators when developing transformative technologies. Fundamental advances in genomic understanding and biology have seeded a bloom of innovation. Plants have been a target of selective breeding for centuries; genetic engineering is currently accelerating optimized crop development, from plants with triple their original nutritional value to those with resistance to diseases. More recently, science has looked to turn these tools of genetic manipulation, such as CRISPR, to human genomes. The genetic editing of human embryos is an ethical minefield. Germline editing further risks permanently altering the human gene pool over time, driving down the prevalence of certain traits or perhaps eliminating them entirely. Governments can incentivize or mandate the engineering of certain traits in humans such as those of strength, health, and intelligence to mold their ideal civilian and military populations. However, germline editing has the potential to permanently eliminate debilitating and fatal genetic diseases, induce greater immunity to illness, and increase longevity in future generations of humans. The study and engineering of viruses has immense benefits in vaccine development, understanding of transmission methods, and development of antivirals. Paradoxically, the deliberate engineering of viruses as biological warfare agents is also made possible by breakthrough discoveries about virus behaviour and structure. It is easy to visualize a genetic agent that causes crop blight in nations dependent on specific monocultures, devastating economies and starving populations. It is exactly because biotechnology has potential to do such good that it holds the threat of doing evil. Owing to political structures that reward seniority, politicians are often slow and ill-equipped to recognize, let alone effectively regulate the use of cutting edge technologies. In addition, technologies that have the potential to affect the entire human gene pool should be treated with international concern; comprehensive ethical guidelines for different types of genetic editing developed by the WHO and UN may serve as helpful guidelines for distinguishing permissible and unacceptable uses of genetic editing technologies. (The WHO has already published such guidelines, but only in reaction to He Jiankui’s announcement of the birth of genetically modified twins). Furthermore, international agreement is a prerequisite to the prevention of use of biological warfare agents, since countries must be in mutual agreement to not develop such technologies. Bioethicists and researchers with the insight to can predict research areas and technologies where dual use situations will arise must coordinate an effort to proactively prevent misuse of technologies, and communicate the urgency of such issues to national and international bodies in order to regulate and stymie dual use applications.
Furthermore, biotech is becoming increasingly accessible to the general public. Open science is encouraged in synthetic biology and access to papers and methodology abounds, even in controversial cases–in 2012, virology researcher Ron Fourchier developed airborne H5N1 virus in ferrets with only five mutations from the original genome (normally, H5N1 requires cell-cell contact to spread), causing Nature and Science to pause publication of his research over concerns about layperson access to the viral sequences (the paper is now available online). Plasmid maps, promoter sequences, and even instructional materials (i.e. youtube videos) on developing genetic constructs at home are readily available on the world wide web. Synthetic biology follows a standard format of BioBricks, which allows easy assembly of biological parts and systems. In addition, biological tools are rapidly increasing in power and decreasing in cost–the rate of advancement in genetic sequencing has already outpaced Moore’s Law. In the future, DIY genetic engineering may be as easy as ordering gene editing kits and materials directly to the doorstep and synthesizing biobrick constructs as a garage bench side project. Many beneficial applications can come with rogue methods (for example, biohackers have harnessed open access to genetic information to cheaply synthesize insulin). However, the barrier for developing nefarious systems with biotechnology is undeniably lowered with increasing access. Questions remain in the regulation and screening of potentially hazardous biological materials in such an open system. Some proposed solutions include allowing gene synthesis firms and oligonucleotide providers to scan for suspicious purchases and store order records, or the creation of a governmental certification body for genetic parts outside of laboratory use. It is commonly accepted that in nuclear physics, not all information should be made public at risk of the development of weapons by militaries across the world. Considering that the barrier of entry in biotechnology is much lower than that of particle physics, whether open science is hazardous in biology remains a subject of debate. Proponents of open science weigh the risk of dual use against democratizing scientific access across universities and educational institutions, increased research to protect against dangerous applications of biotechnology, and elevated rate of innovation.
In the shadow of sarin gas, VX, phosgene, and the atom bomb, concern for dual use in biotechnology is well-justified. Researchers cannot act carelessly under the veneer of ignorance. Biotechnology’s benefits are inseparable from its flipside of its potential abuses–it’s the responsibility of scientists to balance ethics when pursuing innovation. To scientists, “what does it mean to be human?” is a genetic question, but it should also be a moral one. The duality of this fundamental question mirrors the dual nature of technological innovation.
Written and illustrated by Isabelle Guo.
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/03/12/the-deadliest-virus
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5hgz15.9